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Assistant District Attorney; FRANCIS D. RINEER, Assistant District Attorney; GREG 
HOSTETTLER, Bradford County Detective; CAPTAIN DONALD C. PETERS; 
TROOPER BERNOSKY; TROOPER PETROS; DAVID C. PELACHICK; GEORGE C. 
CONFER; UNKNOWN TROOPERS, Pennsylvania State Police; DANIEL J. 
BARRETT, District Attorney, Bradford County; JEFFREY SMITH, Bradford County 
Judge; MARYLOU VANDERPOOL, Bradford County Court Administrator; JOHN 
KERN, JR.; LEONARD D. SIMPSON, District Attorney Sullivan County; CYNTHIA 
DUNLAP 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 08-cv-01560) 
District Judge:  Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 1, 2015 
Before:  FUENTES, SHWARTZ and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 7, 2015) 
___________ 
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OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Cyrus Sanders appeals the District Court’s order denying his motion for relief 
from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b).  For the reasons 
set forth below, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 Sanders filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various 
prosecutors, law enforcement officials, employees of the Bradford County Court of 
Common Pleas, and a private individual, Cynthia Dunlap, each of whom he believed to 
be responsible for violating his constitutional rights.  The complaint arises out of 
Sanders’ arrest and a subsequent search of his home by the Pennsylvania State Police 
(PSP), during which they seized several items.  Sanders claimed that he denied them 
permission to search the property, but that the PSP conspired with defendant Dunlap, 
who allegedly represented herself as his common law wife, to obtain such permission.  
Sanders was subsequently convicted of receiving stolen property based on evidence 
seized from his home.  In the complaint, Sanders maintained that the search was illegal 
and that he was falsely arrested.  He further alleged that certain items of his property, 
including a “specialized vehicle,” were unlawfully taken from his residence during his 
subsequent incarceration.  He maintained that certain officers, prosecutors and court 
                                                                    
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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personnel failed to assist him in his efforts to retrieve his property, thereby violating his 
due process and equal protection rights. 
 The District Court entered an order dismissing the claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 12(b)(6).  On appeal, we affirmed the order in part, and vacated with directions to 
evaluate, with respect to his unlawful search claim, whether Sanders was present at the 
time of the search and therefore had notice for purposes of the statute of limitations.  
Sanders v. Downs, 420 F. App’x 175 (3d Cir. 2011).  On remand, the District Court 
granted summary judgment to the remaining defendants in an order entered June 24, 
2013.  Sander’s appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because it was untimely 
filed.  See C.A. No. 13-3822.  In February 2014, Sanders filed a motion for relief from 
judgment based on mistake, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), and newly discovered evidence, 
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2).  The District Court denied the motion and this timely appeal 
ensued. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Generally, we review the District 
Court's denial of a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) for an abuse of discretion.  Jackson v. 
Danberg, 656 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2011).  See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 
244, 251 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining also that we exercise plenary review over 
orders granting or denying relief under Rule 60(b)(4)).  An appeal from the denial of Rule 
60(b) relief does not bring up the underlying judgment for review where, as here, it was 
not filed within the time frame pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4).  See Browder v. Dir., 
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Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7 (1978).  We may affirm on any basis supported by 
the record.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011).  
 In his motion, Sanders argues that the District Court “mistakenly” granted 
immunity to the defendant prosecutors of Bradford County “by failing to address the fact 
[that] members of the Bradford County DA’s Office supplied false information to the 
PSP.”1  Fed. Rule Civ. P. 60(b)(1) permits relief from judgment on the grounds of 
“mistake.”  Sanders’ argument, however, is more akin to a claim of legal error on the part 
of the District Court.  We have noted that “some courts have held that legal error without 
more cannot be corrected under Rule 60(b),” while other courts “have held that legal 
error may be characterized as ‘mistake’ within the meaning of Rule 60(b)(1), but only 
where the motion is made . . . within the time allowed for appeal.”  Page v. Schweiker, 
786 F.2d 150,154-55 (3d Cir. 1986).  Sanders filed his motion long after the time period 
to appeal expired; accordingly, even assuming Page allows for the possibility that a claim 
of legal error can be raised under Rule 60(b)(1), Sanders’ belated motion rendered relief 
unavailable.  Nevertheless, because he presents allegedly “new evidence” in support, we 
will analyze the claim under Rule 60(b)(2). 
                                                                    
1  In the R&R addressing the Rule 60(b) motion, which was adopted by the District 
Court, the Magistrate Judge recommended rejecting this basis for relief because the 
claims against the prosecutors were dismissed “for reasons other than prosecutorial 
immunity.”  This conclusion was in error.  In a memorandum accompanying its order, the 
District Court explicitly dismissed the claims against the prosecutors on the basis of 
absolute immunity.  Dst. Ct. 3/9/10 Memorandum, pg. 10.  We affirmed the dismissal of 
the claims on this basis.  Sanders, 420 F. App’x at 180. 
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 Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2), a district court has discretion to reopen a judgment only 
if the newly discovered evidence is material and would “probably have changed the 
outcome” of the proceedings.  See Bohus v. Beloff, 950 F.2d 919, 930 (3d Cir. 1991).  In 
support of his claim, Sanders first provides two letters from the PSP responding to his 
complaints regarding the alleged theft of his vehicle.  The first letter, dated June 12, 
2007, indicates that the Bradford County District Attorney’s Office concluded, based on 
an investigation by the PSP, that Sanders’ dispute with defendant Dunlap over the 
ownership of the vehicle was a civil matter, which Sanders could pursue through civil 
litigation.  The second letter, dated May 20, 2013, references the 2007 letter, and 
reaffirms the “matter in establishing interest in ownership” in the vehicle, is a civil, rather 
than a criminal matter.  These letters are insufficient to warrant the “extraordinary relief” 
afforded by Rule 60(b).  See id. (“We view Rule 60(b) motions as ‘extraordinary relief 
which should be granted only where extraordinary circumstances are present.’”) (citation 
omitted).   
 First, the evidence is not “new,” as the 2007 letter pre-dates the civil suit and the 
2013 letter reiterates information available in the first letter.  Moreover, as was noted in 
the dismissal of the claims, a prosecutor is absolutely immune from the decision 
regarding whether a matter presents sufficient evidence to warrant a criminal prosecution.  
See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) (“[I]n initiating a prosecution . . . the 
prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983.”).  These letters do not 
indicate, as Sanders suggests, that the prosecutor’s office “took the position of a 
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complaining witness,” or gave “legal advi[c]e” to the PSP.  See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 
509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) (a prosecutor is granted only qualified immunity when 
performing investigatory or administrative functions, or is essentially functioning as a 
law enforcement officer).   Nor is it clear that the decision was “false” or “malicious.”  
Because the letters merely reflect the Bradford County District Attorney’s Office’s 
decision that the evidence surrounding the ownership of Sanders’ vehicle did not warrant 
criminal prosecution, the letters were clearly not material.   
 Next, Sanders provided evidence which he argued demonstrates his “sole 
ownership of the vehicle,” and further supports his allegations against the prosecutor’s 
office.  The evidence, which consists of two letters from the Attorney General’s office 
indicating that an “Order to Show Cause” was filed against Bruce Cohen, the notary 
public who notarized the transfer of title of the vehicle from Sanders to Dunlap, is not 
“new.”  The first letter is dated April 2013, while the suit was still pending in the District 
Court, and the second letter, dated after the suit was dismissed, merely reiterates 
information set forth in the first.  Moreover, as the District Court noted, Cohen was not a 
party to the civil rights suit; therefore, even if it was new, the evidence was immaterial 
and insufficient for purposes of Rule 60(b)(2).2  
                                                                    
2  In the appendix to his appellate brief, Sanders included a consent agreement between 
the Attorney General and Cohen, which was not part of the record before the District 
Court.  See Clark v. K-Mart Corp., 979 F.2d 965, 967 (3d Cir. 1992) (appeals are limited 
to the facts that were developed in the District Court).  We note that, in the agreement, 
Cohen acknowledged that he notarized the transfer of a vehicle from Sanders to 
defendant Dunlap, but neglected to record the transaction in the notary register, and failed 
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 Finally, the District Court properly concluded that Sanders’ affidavit from 
Dunlap’s son suggesting Dunlap conspired with the PSP to allow it to illegally search 
Sanders’ home is not “new evidence.”  The affidavit, which Sanders signed as a witness, 
was dated prior to the filing of the amended complaint and, therefore, was clearly 
discoverable at that time.   
  Accordingly, because there is no basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(1), and the 
evidence presented pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2) is neither new nor material, the District 
Court order denying the motion for relief from judgment will be affirmed. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
to appropriately list certain notarization fees.  Contrary to Sanders’ contention, it does not 
demonstrate that Cohen fraudulently transferred ownership of the vehicle to Dunlap; it 
merely documents his failure to comply with the state’s notary code. As the May 2013 
letter − which is part of the District Court record − indicates, the Attorney General’s 
investigation “dealt exclusively” with Cohen’s “compliance with the Commonwealth 
laws in reference to the proper transfer of property between parties rather than any 
establishment of ownership of property.” 
